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INTRODUCTION 
Is copyright fair use a fact question for the jury or a legal 
question for the court? On appeal, are fair use decisions reviewed 
deferentially or de novo? In other words, is fair use a question of fact 
for the jury and off limits to appellate court second-guessing, or is fair 
use a question of law for which an appellate court can decide anew? 
In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, the Federal Circuit viewed the 
jury’s fair use verdict “as advisory only” and independently reweighed 
the fair use factors, concluding that “allowing Google to commercially 
exploit Oracle’s work will not advance the purposes of copyright in 
this case.”1 The Federal Circuit’s handling of the jury’s fair use verdict 
raises important and timely questions about how to conceptualize and 
operationalize fair use. This Article is the first to lay bare the reality 
that who decides fair use—judge or jury—is a pure policy question. 
To tackle thorny questions about deciding fair use, this Article 
proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the nature of fair use, including 
whether it is better understood as an affirmative defense or as an 
 
 © Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The 
Author gratefully acknowledges that this project was supported by a 2018 Free Speech 
and Open Inquiry Grant provided by the Institute for Humane Studies at George 
Mason University. The Author also expresses warm appreciation for constructive 
comments from Eric E. Johnson, Eric P. Robinson, and participants at AEJMC’s 
102nd annual conference in Toronto, Canada. This work is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
 1. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1196, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“Having undertaken a case-specific analysis of all four factors, we must weigh 
the factors together in light of the purposes of copyright. We conclude that allowing 
Google to commercially exploit Oracle’s work will not advance the purposes of 
copyright in this case.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted), cert. granted, 2019 
WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956).  
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affirmative right. Notwithstanding Supreme Court dicta that fair use 
is an affirmative defense, persuasive scholarly critiques suggest this 
characterization is a mistake.2 Whether fair use is denominated simply 
a defense, or rather an affirmative defense, affects which party has the 
burden of proving fair use and which party will prevail if the evidence 
is in equipoise. On this point, I join the chorus of scholars arguing fair 
use needs a course correction.3 As a matter of statutory construction, 
fair use is better understood as a right and a definitional limit on a 
copyright holder’s statutory rights. As a definitional limit on a 
copyright holder’s statutory rights, fair use cannot logically be 
denominated an affirmative defense. Fair use should not be a user’s 
burden to prove, rather it should be part of the copyright holder’s 
prima facie case. And more than simply a statutory right, fair use is 
consigned a speech-protective function. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that fair use, along with the idea-expression dichotomy, 
are “built-in First Amendment accommodations.”4  
If fair use is conceptualized as a statutory right and a speech-
protective safeguard, the next question is how fair use questions are 
operationalized. Part II examines who decides fair use, including 
whether it is a fact question for the jury or a legal question for the 
court—and then whether such decisions are reviewed deferentially or 
de novo by an appellate court. But fair use questions do not fit neatly 
into the law/fact paradigm that typically guides decision-making 
authority.5 Fair use is denominated a “mixed” question of law and fact 
because it entails applying the law to the facts.6 Law-application-
mixed questions that are deemed more fact-like are decided by a jury, 
whereas mixed questions that are deemed more law-like are decided 
by the court.7  
 
 2. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the arguments of scholars who 
suggest that considering fair use an affirmative defense is a mistake). 
 3. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 685, 698 (2015); see also Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 163 (2011); Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A 
Constitutional Imperative, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 165–66 (2007). 
 4. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003)). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the standard of review for fair use 
decisions). 
 6. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 
560 (1985) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”).  
 7. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. 
at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018) (“Mixed questions are not all alike.”). 
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Part III discusses why it matters who decides fair use.8 In brief, 
if fair use is an affirmative speech-protective right, then it matters if 
we entrust this decision to a judge or a jury. Rather than hiding behind 
the “slippery” distinction between fact and law,9 this Article explains 
how the allocation of decision-making authority in fair use 
determinations is a matter of judicial politics. In general, decision-
making responsibility is allocated both horizontally and vertically 
within the court system.10 Horizontally, the allocative choice is 
between the trial judge and the jury—often under the influence of the 
Seventh Amendment.11 Vertically, standards of appellate review 
allocate the center of gravity for decision-making authority between 
the trial court and the appellate court. A mixed question lacks an a 
priori guide to assigning decision-making authority. It often devolves 
to a matter of judicial preference. In other words, whether a judge or 
jury decides a mixed question risks being dictated by judicial 
preference—not the Seventh Amendment or other sound policy. 
Categorizing fair use as either more fact-like or more law-like reflects 
a normative allocative policy assessment about who should decide 
such questions. The pregnant policy question is whether we want 
speech-protective rights assessed by a judge or a jury. Who has the 
institutional capacity to do a better job? Who do we trust more? 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE NATURE OF FAIR USE 
The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”12 
Congress enacted the first copyright act in 1790.13 While some 
measure of copyright protection has existed since the founding of our 
 
 8. See infra Part III (discussing fair use as determined by judges and juries). 
 9. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1995) (“[T]he proper 
characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery.”); see also 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (“[W]e [do not] yet know of 
any other rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a 
legal conclusion.”). 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. See generally Amanda Reid, Fructifying the 
First Amendment: An Asymmetric Approach to Constitutional Fact Doctrine, 11 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 109 (2019) (conceptualizing the court system as having both a horizontal 
plane and a vertical plane, with the trial court level as a horizontal plane and the 
appellate court level as a vertical plane). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
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republic, scholars have long pondered the existential nature of the 
right.14 In particular, is copyright purely a limited statutory creation, 
or do authors have a natural right to the fruits of their labor, 
independent of the statutory rights? The Supreme Court resoundingly 
resolved the nature-debate by concluding U.S. copyright is a limited 
statutory creation, rather than an unconstrained natural right.15 In 
Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court rejected the natural law 
argument.16 Rather than legislating against the backdrop of a natural 
right, the Wheaton Court held that “Congress, then, by this [copyright] 
act, instead of sanctioning an existing right . . . created it.”17 Copyright, 
the Court explained, “does not exist at common law—it originated, if 
at all, under the acts of congress.”18 
Copyright is entirely a statutory product, not a common law 
product.19 The Supreme Court recently clarified that patents—which 
flow from the same constitutional authority as copyrights—are also 
purely a statutory product, not a common law product.20 Copyright, 
 
 14. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 
45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945) (“What is it that the law of copyright is really trying 
to accomplish?”); see also Morris Ebenstein, Introduction, in COPYRIGHT LAW: BASIC 
AND RELATED MATERIALS xx (1956) (“What is the subject of copyright? What is the 
object of copyright? In short, what is copyright?”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The 
Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 
1009 (2010) (“Copyright, to put the case bluntly, is an analytical mess.”). 
 15. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). See also 
Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 966, 978–79. U.S. copyright was modeled on the 
English Statute of Anne. See id. at 966 (citing Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 
(G.B.)). Under the Statute of Anne, a similar question arose whether the statute 
supplemented a preexisting natural right or whether it created a heretofore nonexistent 
right. See id. In 1774, the English House of Lords, in Donaldson v. Beckett, rejected 
the argument of a perpetual copyright and concluded that published works remained 
exclusive property only for the statutory term. See id. at 978–79 (citing Donaldson v. 
Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 846–47 (rejecting perpetual common law right 
of authors in favor of the limited right of times set in the statute), overruling Millar v. 
Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201). 
 16. See Peters, 33 U.S. at 661 (“That [C]ongress, in passing the act of 1790, 
did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear . . . .”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 663. See also Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of 
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1119, 1156–70 (1983). 
 19. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19 
(1968) (“Copyright was not a product of the common law. It was a product of 
censorship, guild monopoly, trade-regulation statutes, and misunderstanding.”). 
 20. See Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1374 (2018) (“The franchise gives the patent owner the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States. 
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more directly, is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional or natural 
right.21 Copyright is an instrument for achieving a utilitarian goal of 
promoting the “harvest of knowledge.”22 As the Harper & Row Court 
explained, “[t]he rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure 
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”23 
Copyright is best understood as a limited-term intrusion upon the 
public domain, rather than a plenary property right.24 Copyright is a 
government license, limited by the social goals of the copyright 
bargain. As the Sony Court noted, “the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved.”25 Moreover, the 
Court explained, “It is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.”26 Once copyright on a work 
ends, the work is free for all to use. And during the term of protection, 
the work is free for fair use. 
Whether denominated fair abridgment or fair use, courts have 
long excluded certain uses from a copyright holder’s exclusive 
 
That right did not exist at common law. Rather, it is a creature of statute law.”) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 21. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 251 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “copyright is a creature of statute”); see also Harry N. Rosenfield, The 
Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
790, 791–92 (1975). Cf. Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1375 (2018) (“Patents convey only a specific form of property right—a public 
franchise. . . . As a public franchise, a patent can confer only the rights that the statute 
prescribes.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 
(1985). 
 23. Id. at 546. 
 24. See Birch, supra note 3, at 152 n.30 (“[C]opyright is less a subset of 
property law than a subset of public-domain law, which becomes clear when one 
realizes that all writings fall into one of two categories: those that are copyrightable 
and those that are not. Writings in this latter category are in the public domain.”). 
Patents are also an intrusion on the public domain. See Oil States Energy Servs., 138 
S. Ct. at 1373 (“By ‘issuing patents,’ the PTO ‘take[s] from the public rights of 
immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee.’” (quoting United States v. 
Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888))). 
 25. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  
 26. Id.; see also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“The ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and 
understanding, which copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators 
exclusive control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive 
to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public consumption.”). 
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domain.27 Downstream creators and secondary users have perennially 
been allowed to make fair use of copyrighted works by transforming 
and reusing a work. Fair use is an essential part of the copyright 
design. At its core, the copyright schema needs fair use.28 As the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, “from the infancy of copyright 
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has 
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”29 And as Judge 
Pierre Leval explained, “[t]he objectives of fair use are the objectives 
of copyright.”30 Copyright’s internal struggle is the inherent tension 
between protecting extant works and fostering new creations.31 Fair 
use helps mediate and balance these interests in protecting both the 
new and the old. At its core, fair use is a speech-protective safeguard 
that helps copyright achieve its constitutionally mandated purpose of 
promoting human progress.32 
Fair use is designed to be an adaptable doctrine. But fair use’s 
plasticity is both a virtue and a vice.33 Courts have called the fair use 
doctrine “so flexible as virtually to defy definition”34 and “one of the 
most unsettled areas of the law.”35 The question of fair use is “the most 
 
 27. See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 
1410 (2011) (“As the prehistory of fair use makes plain, copyright owners’ rights have 
been subject to and defined by the public’s fair use rights since the beginnings of 
statutory copyright.”). 
 28. Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1110 (1990) (“Fair use should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated 
departure from the grand conception of the copyright monopoly. To the contrary, it is 
a necessary part of the overall design.”). 
 29. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting 
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 30. Pierre N. Leval, Campbell As Fair Use Blueprint?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
597, 602 (2015). 
 31. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575–76. 
 32. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328–29 (2012) (“Given the ‘speech-
protective purposes and safeguards’ embraced by copyright law [i.e., the 
‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense], we concluded in Eldred that 
there was no call for the heightened review petitioners sought in that case. We reach 
the same conclusion here.” (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))). 
 33. See Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The 
Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 
1857 (2007) (“The source of the meritorious flexibility of fair use—its open-ended 
and discretionary character—is also the main cause of its deficiencies.”). 
 34. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968).  
 35. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 
1392 (6th Cir. 1996).  
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troublesome in the whole law of copyright,” a distinguished panel of 
the Second Circuit once bemoaned.36 Its fluctuant nature is illustrated 
by the fact that, on two occasions, fair use decisions were affirmed by 
an equally divided Supreme Court.37 And of the three recent fair use 
cases to reach the High Court, each was overturned at successive 
levels of appellate review—and two of the cases divided the Court.38 
The consternation of courts and commentators is manifest.39 Professor 
Paul Goldstein put it colorfully: “Fair use is the great white whale of 
American copyright law. Enthralling, enigmatic, protean, it endlessly 
fascinates us even as it defeats our every attempt to subdue it.”40  
 
 36. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per 
curiam) (decided by judges Learned Hand, Augustus N. Hand, and Robert P. 
Patterson); see also EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 386–87 
(1879) (“[T]o draw the line between a fair and an unlawful use, is often one of the 
most difficult problems in the law of copyright.”); Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law 
of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 52 (1953) (“There is one proposition about 
fair use on which there is widespread agreement: it is not easy to decide what is and 
what is not a fair use.”). 
 37. See generally Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975) (per curiam) (Blackmun, J., abstained), aff’g by an equally divided court 487 
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew’s Inc., 356 U.S. 43, 43 
(1958) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., abstained), aff’g by an equally divided court Benny 
v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). See also Harvey S. Perlman & Laurens 
H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyright, 
and the Judicial Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 404 (1975) (“A single doctrine that 
has forced the Court to divide equally twice can claim some measure of difficulty.”). 
 38. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
(9-0 decision); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
(6-3 decision); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(5-4 decision); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2018) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (“The malleability 
of fair use emerges starkly from the fact that all three [Supreme Court] cases [in 1984, 
1985, and 1994] were overturned at each level of review, two of them by split opinions 
at the Supreme Court level.”) (citations omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More 
Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 457 (2013) (“Copyrights 
are really complicated.”); see also Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair 
Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 273, 278 (2015) (“[F]air use has been 
bestowed with epithets such as ‘disarray,’ ‘in bad shape,’ ‘notoriously vague,’ 
‘nobody knows,’ ‘great white whale of American copyright law,’ ‘protean,’ 
‘difficult—some say impossible—to define,’ ‘confusion,’ ‘guess and pray,’ 
‘mysterious,’ ‘disorderly basket of exceptions,’ ‘precarious,’ ‘nearly impossible to 
predict,’ ‘as vague as possible,’ ‘more fickle than fair,’ and ‘astonishingly bad.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 40. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433 
(2008). 
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Modern fair use is often traced to the 1841 case Folsom v. 
Marsh.41 Justice Joseph Story, while sitting as a circuit court judge, 
famously articulated the considerations that would later inform the 
statutory fair use factors.42 In deciding whether a defendant—who 
published a two-volume work containing material from plaintiff’s 
twelve-volume work—infringed plaintiff’s copyright, Justice Story 
stated:  
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, 
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the 
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.43  
Justice Story’s considerations are often credited as the progenitor of 
the U.S. fair use doctrine.44 
The 1976 Copyright Act codified the judicially-created fair use 
considerations.45 Section 107 does not define fair use, rather it lists 
four “factors to be considered.”46 These four statutory factors, echoing 
Folsom v. Marsh, are (1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.47 The statute 
also expressly provides that fair use of a copyrighted work “is not an 
 
 41. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4,901). 
 42. See id. at 347–48. 
 43. Id. at 348.  
 44. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, 
Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 229 
(2008) (“In Folsom, Justice Story introduced into American copyright law the concept 
of fair use. Ironically, the fair use doctrine is commonly celebrated today as one of 
the major safeguards against overexpansion of copyright protection. At the time it was 
introduced by Justice Story, however, it was a vehicle for a radical enlargement of the 
scope of copyright. The introduction of fair use fundamentally changed copyright’s 
baseline. Formerly, infringement was limited to near-verbatim reproduction and all 
other subsequent uses were considered legitimate. In the new fair use environment, 
all subsequent uses became presumptively infringing unless found to be fair use.”). 
 45. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 
(1985) (“The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act 
reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law doctrine.”). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
 47. See id.; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 13.05[A] 
(“[T]he four factors enumerated in the statute are sometimes augmented by extra-
statutory interlopers.”). 
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infringement of copyright.”48 The legislative history suggests that by 
including a statutory provision for fair use, Congress sought to codify 
the judicial doctrine but not alter it. The House Report accompanying 
the law indicated Congress’s intent in enacting Section 107 was “to 
restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, 
or enlarge it in any way.”49 The statute was thus intended to codify, 
but not ossify or alter, fair use.50 
This codification of fair use left open some important questions 
about the nature of fair use. Perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, 
fair use is little more than a variant of the Golden Rule: “Take not from 
others to such an extent and in such a manner that you would be 
resentful if they so took from you.”51 Other scholars have urged that 
fair use is “allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that 
the author must have foreseen it and tacitly consented to it.”52 This 
tacit consent can give rise to an “implied license” to use a copyrighted 
work.53 On this theory, commentators have urged that “custom or 
public policy defines what is reasonable.”54 Courts have also endorsed 
this view: “As we balance these [fair use] factors, we bear in mind that 
fair use is appropriate where a ‘reasonable copyright owner’ would 
have consented to the use, i.e., where the ‘custom or public policy’ at 
 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5680. 
 50. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright 
Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 259 (1988) (“The views of Congress as expressed in 
the House Report therefore can be boiled down to three propositions: first, no exact 
rules are possible; second, the statute does not freeze the law; and third, the statute 
does not change the law.”). 
 51. Joseph McDonald, Non-Infringing Uses, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 466, 
467 (1962); see also John Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 
53 IOWA L. REV. 832, 837 (1968) (“The doctrine of fair use is even simpler to apply 
since it is based on good faith, and most problems may be answered by recourse to 
the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.’”). 
 52. RICHARD CROSBY DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 
(1925). 
 53. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(“[I]n order to promote the creation of new works, our laws contemplate that some 
secondary users—those implied licensees making fair use of copyrighted works—will 
be allowed to make use of original authors’ works.”). 
 54. Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & 
Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 15 (1960), 
https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study14.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DSC-
TQZW] (Study No. 14, 15). 
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the time would have defined the use as reasonable.”55 While it may be 
a tempting way to conceptualize fair use, custom and the Golden Rule 
are ultimately inadequate standards.  
Custom does not delimit fair use; a novel use can be a fair use.56 
Moreover, an implied license can be extinguished by routine express 
denial of use.57 Blanket prohibitions against unconsented use vitiate 
tacit consent or custom as a basis for fair use. The Golden Rule also 
cannot be a reliable touchstone because some copyright holders have 
capacious views of their rights. Some rightsholders have urged for 
perpetual copyright protection58—notwithstanding the clear 
constitutional directive that protection endure for “limited Times.”59 
Broad copyright notices stating “[n]o part of this publication may be 
reproduced without permission in writing from the publisher” or 
“[a]ny use of this telecast or any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of 
the game without the NFL’s consent is prohibited”60 also illustrate this 
perspective.61 Some copyright holders have an expansive view of the 
zone they think they can control.62 The Golden Rule rests on a notion 
of resentfulness, but resentfulness starts to look like an expectation. 
And as expectations grow, fair use shrinks.  
 
 55. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778 
(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks & Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 15 (1960)).  
 56. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 52 (“An entirely new use may be held to be 
a fair use if it meets the tests which the courts have laid down. Although fair use has 
been defined as a use which is reasonable and customary, no court has said that a use 
must be customary in order to be fair.”) (citation omitted). 
 57. See id. at 51. 
 58. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 n.11 (2003) (noting there have 
been “proponents of perpetual copyright,” including the Songwriters Guild). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 60. See Eric Gebert, The Long Arm of the National Football League: Is the 
NFL’s Copyright Policy Violating the Rights of Its Fans and Franchises?, B.C. INT. 
PROP. & TECH. F. (Feb. 6, 2017), http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blog-
The-Long-Arm-of-the-National-Football-League-Gebert.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MJ6U-BUWF]. 
 61. Cf. Haochen Sun, Fair Use As A Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
125, 158 (2011) (“[M]any copyright holders have routinely exaggerated the scope of 
their economic rights as a way to prevent the public from making a fair use of their 
works. For example, the cautionary notice—‘No part of this book can be reproduced 
without the permission of the publisher’—appears in almost every book published, 
copyrighted or not.”). 
 62. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF 
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 3 (1991) (“Not surprisingly, copyright owners 
tend to give the fair-use doctrine a narrow reading, while users naturally take a broader 
view.”). 
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Fair use cannot depend on custom or the Golden Rule.63 
Copyright is a goal-oriented statutory privilege fashioned to promote 
the progress of science and learning.64 And fair use is a user’s right 
that helps the copyright schema achieve its goals.65 
Copyright is a shared right of use between the rightsholder and 
the public.66 Fair use, much like the freedom of the press, is a right of 
the people, not wholly a right of the publishers.67 As the Supreme 
Court explained, the First Amendment “guarantees are not for the 
benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us” because 
“[a] broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of 
our political system and an open society.”68 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court observed that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors 
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”69 The Court emphasized 
that reward to the copyright holder is a “secondary consideration” to 
that of the public weal.70  
Granting copyright holders certain exclusive rights is a means to 
an enlightened public. Similarly, protecting a free press is a means to 
 
 63. Cf. Leon R. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 214 
(1954) (“What is ‘fair use’ is to be determined by judicial criteria, not by the copyright 
owner’s fiat.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 28, at 1107 (“The copyright is not an 
inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of 
their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for 
the intellectual enrichment of the public. This utilitarian goal is achieved by permitting 
authors to reap the rewards of their creative efforts.”); see also Ebenstein, supra note 
14, at xx (“Another fact, which, although well known, is frequently ‘lost in the 
shuffle,’ [sic] is that statutory copyright is solely the product of a fixed principle of 
public policy and consequently is governed and dominated by that principle. That 
principle is that it is desirable ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts.’ [sic] 
Consequently, copyright protection is granted when to do so accords with that 
principle and is withheld when it is inconsistent with that principle.”). 
 65. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 62, at 11; see also Sun, supra 
note 61, at 132. 
 66. See Birch, supra note 3, at 147 n.22 (“The real difference between 
copyright as property and other types of property, then, is that copyright is primarily 
a right of use shared by the owner with others, but for different purposes. The owner’s 
right of use is to sell copies of the work, the user’s right is to use the copy for 
learning.”). 
 67. See Rosenfield, supra note 21, at 794–95. 
 68. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). 
 69. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 70. Id. 
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promoting an informed public. The public must be informed in order 
to make rational choices, and the public must be able to make rational 
choices in order to maintain a free society.71 Publishers and the press 
are thus a conduit to inform, educate, and entertain the public. The 
right of the listener and the user—both as a consumer and a citizen—
should not be subordinated to the means of promoting the progress of 
learning.72 But users’ rights have long lacked an effective champion.73 
Copyright is a classic public-choice tragedy.74 Public-choice theory 
teaches that small, organized groups are more effective at lobbying for 
favorable legislation than larger, more heterogeneous groups.75 
Incumbent rightsholders have exerted a preternatural influence on the 
legislative process—to the detriment of the public interest.76 One way 
to reinvigorate the public interest is to stop labeling fair use as an 
affirmative defense.77 Instead, it should simply be denominated a 
 
 71. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 104 
(1928) (“There is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without 
knowledge . . . . Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of liberty is the liberty of the 
mind to absorb and to beget. . . . At the root of all liberty is the liberty to know.”).  
 72. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and 
no buyers.”). 
 73. See Chafee, supra note 14, at 517 (“In short, everybody is organized 
except the readers and consumers, who have more at stake than anybody else. 
Congress ought to speak for them, but it is subjected to tremendous pressure from the 
groups which are organized.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 278, 291–92 (2004); Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success 
vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 
786 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 (1993); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187–95 (1992); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation 
and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 312 (1989). 
 75. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT (1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 76. See, e.g., William F. Patry, A Few Observations About the State of 
Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 88 
(Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017) (suggesting an unhealthy addition to “[a]mending our 
copyright laws by making them stronger and stronger” such that “copyright law has 
become a serious threat to culture and the production of new works”); Jessica Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 
(1987) (detailing how incumbents have proposed and drafted various amendments to 
the Copyright Act). 
 77. See Sun, supra note 61, at 129. 
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defense. As discussed below, the copyright holder should carry the 
burden of proof that the use is not fair.78 
The statute expressly states fair use is not an infringement: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair 
use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”79 
But is fair use not an infringement because it is an affirmative 
defense?80 Or is fair use not an infringement because it is an 
affirmative right—beyond the scope of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive domain? Simply denominating fair use as a non-infringing 
use does not answer this inquiry. And this inquiry is significant 
because (1) it affects burdens of proof and (2) it directs who decides 
the question. 
Contrary to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
plain language of the statute, and sound public policy, the Supreme 
Court has denominated fair use as an affirmative defense.81 In Harper 
& Row, the Court stated, “The drafters [of the 1976 Copyright Act] 
resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive 
categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative 
defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”82 This label was picked up 
by Congress seven years later when it amended the Copyright Act in 
 
 78. See Coll. Entrance Examination Bd. v. Cuomo, 788 F. Supp. 134, 140 
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Section 107 states in pertinent part that ‘[t]he fair use of a 
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.’ Therefore, in order to 
demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its copyright infringement 
claim, [plaintiff] must show that the [defendant’s] use of its [copyrighted work] is not 
a fair use.”) (citation omitted), abrogated by H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 n.3 (1992), 
as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553.  
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 80. Cf. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense, and 
[defendant] has presented no evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 81. See Lydia Pallas Loren & R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: 
Burdens of Proof in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
621, 675 (2019) (arguing “fair use is part of the inquiry into what constitutes 
infringement” and that “the legislative history of the 1976 Act does not support 
treating fair use as an affirmative defense”). 
 82. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 
(1985) (emphasis added). But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: 
Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 989 (2002) (positing that language from Harper 
& Row could be read to “suggest[] that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff ‘[t]o 
negate fair use’”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (“[T]o negate fair use one need 
only show that if the challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’” (quoting Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))). 
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1992.83 The Judiciary Committee cited Harper & Row when it 
declared “[f]air use is an affirmative defense” and the “the burden of 
proving fair use is always on the party asserting the defense.”84 Two 
years later, the Court reiterated that fair use is an affirmative defense 
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music: “Since fair use is an affirmative 
defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of 
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant 
markets.”85 In support of its assertion, the Campbell Court relied upon 
both Harper & Row and the 1992 legislative history.86 Scholars have 
criticized the woefully thin analysis of these conclusory statements.87 
Labeling fair use as an affirmative defense, rather than simply a 
defense, is consequential.88 An affirmative defense places the burden 
on the defendant to prove and persuade fair use.89 Carrying the burden 
 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 n.3 (1992),  as reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553. 
 84. Id. (“Fair use is an affirmative defense, and as such is relevant only after 
a copyright owner has made out a prima facie case of infringement. A prima facie 
case of infringement consists of ownership of the right asserted and unauthorized 
appropriation by the defendant of a material amount of expression. The copying of 
facts or of a de minimis amount of expression will not support a prima facie case of 
infringement. Fair use thus excuses the copying of a material amount of expression, 
with the test of materiality involving both quantitative and qualitative inquiries.”). 
 85. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); see also 
Sun, supra note 61, at 150–51 (“[B]y treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts 
have placed too much emphasis on examining the impact of the use on the copyright 
holder’s market, which is required by the fourth factor of the fair use analysis.”). 
 86. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.20. 
 87. See, e.g., Sun, supra note 61, at 142 (“[Q]uestions still remain as to why 
fair use has been uniformly defined as an affirmative defense. Judicial decisions on 
fair use cases shed little light on this point. Nor do the legislative reports and academic 
treatises.”); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1788 (2010) (“Tellingly, in neither Harper & Row, the 1992 
Judiciary Committee Report, nor Campbell does any substantive reason appear to 
support labeling fair use an affirmative defense.”); see also Pamela Samuelson, 
Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 854 n.259 (2015) (“[T]he Court 
in Campbell erred in this assertion about fair use, and this error should be corrected.”). 
 88. See Loren, supra note 3, at 712 (“The difference between a ‘defense’ and 
an ‘affirmative defense’ may seem to be one of degree, but in the context of fair use, 
it is an important distinction with significant consequences. When a defendant asserts 
that the reason he is not an infringer is that his activity is a fair use, the court should 
consider the question of infringement holistically.”); see also Sun, supra note 61, at 
155 (“Treating fair use as merely an affirmative defense has also caused indirect 
harms to users. Placing the burden of proof on users causes them to bear extra 
litigation costs.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Because fair use is an affirmative defense, 
Defendants bear the burden of proof on all of its factors.”); see also Loren, supra note 
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of proof means the defendant (1) must bring forward evidence to 
support fair use (the burden of production) and (2) must convince the 
factfinder that the particular use is indeed fair (the burden of 
persuasion).90 If a defendant fails to carry the burden of proof on an 
affirmative defense, defendant cannot prevail on that basis.91 
Allocating burdens of proof often revolves around 
considerations of policy and practicality.92 Policy considerations look 
at the substantive law, and burden allocations are often driven by an 
interest to either favor or disfavor a litigant based on the underlying 
goals of the substantive law. As scholars note, “[s]ometimes courts put 
a finger on the scales to favor the party who seeks to vindicate the 
policy of the substantive law. In other cases, courts place hurdles in 
the path of the litigant who seeks to advance a position disfavored by 
the substantive law.”93 Beyond policy questions, courts consider 
practicality—particularly with regard to the question of possession of 
proof, which inquires whether one litigant has superior access to the 
evidence that proves a particular fact.94 As Jeremy Bentham noted long 
ago, the burden of proof should rest “on whom it would sit lightest” 
 
3, at 694 (“[B]y labeling fair use an affirmative defense, the Court had created a 
presumption: without proof of the affirmative defense of fair use, the plaintiff would 
prevail on its infringement claim due to the plaintiff’s demonstration of its prima facie 
case of infringement.”). 
 90. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof, 4 HARV. L. REV. 45, 48 
(1890); see also ROBERT E. JONES ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS & EVIDENCE, § 
8:4800 (2019) (“Whether a party has met its burden of production is something the 
judge decides (e.g., on a motion for judgment as a matter of law). Whether a party has 
met its burden of persuasion is something the jury decides.”).  
 91. See Loren, supra note 3, at 690 (“The difference between treating fair use 
as a defense and treating it as an affirmative defense is significant. Not only does the 
label ‘affirmative defense’ trigger a pleading obligation, but it also has an important 
consequence when it comes to the burden of proof. A defense is simply a ‘reason why 
the plaintiff . . . has no valid case.’”) (citations omitted); see also Snow, supra note 
87, at 1784 (“The burden of proof assigns a loser by default, and, for fair users, 
overcoming the default position represents a practical impossibility where the very 
definition of fairness is vague.”). 
 92. See 21B WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5122 
(2d ed. 2005) (“One popular way of categorizing the relevant considers in allocating 
the burdens of proof is The Three Ps—Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof.”); 
see also Loren & Reese, supra note 81, at 626–27. 
 93. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 92, at § 5122. 
 94. See id.; see also Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1079 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“The copyright holder is in a superior position to produce 
documentation of any license and, without the burden shift, the first sale defense 
would require a proponent to prove a negative, i.e., that the software was not 
licensed.”). 
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and on the party who could fulfill the requirements with the least 
“vexation, delay, and expense.”95 
Labeling fair use an affirmative defense places the burden of 
proof on the defendant, which ultimately chills permissible and 
socially valuable uses.96 In particular, defendants have the difficulty of 
proving that a use does not cause market harm.97 In Harper & Row, 
the Court emphasized that the effect on the market is “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.”98 And defendants cannot 
carry the burden of proof on the affirmative defense without 
“favorable evidence about relevant markets,” as the Campbell Court 
noted.99 A defendant’s difficulty in carrying the burden of proof was 
crystalized by one scholar: 
First, it may be virtually impossible for a user to produce evidence that there 
is no market for the infringing use: what evidence can a user produce 
beyond a bald assertion? Second, the owner is better suited to produce 
evidence about the existence of a market—the facts may be particularly 
within the control of the owner.100 
 
 95. Thayer, supra note 90, at 59 (quoting Jeremy Bentham); see also United 
States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256–57 n.5 (1957) 
(“The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden 
upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his 
adversary.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Haochen Sun, Copyright and Responsibility, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS 
& ENT. L. 263, 312 (2013) (“This asymmetry between copyright holders and users 
concerning the burden of proof may deter users from making fair uses of works even 
though they are harmless to copyright holders.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 721 (2003) (“Many would-be commentators, critics, and 
parodists may be considerably deterred by the risk that they’ll be erroneously held 
legally liable if the fair use case is close. Very few potential creators would be 
considerably deterred by the risk that some people will be erroneously allowed to 
engage in commentary, criticism, and parody when the fair use question is close.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Sun, supra note 96, at 312 (“The burden of proving the absence 
of market harm is troublesome for users, as it is not easy for them to obtain data about 
copyright holders’ market and examine the market impact of their uses on copyright 
holders.”). 
 98. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985). 
 99. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) 
(“Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying 
the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant 
markets.”). 
 100. Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: 
New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1178 (2000). 
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Thus, the current assignment of the burden of proof tilts the scales in 
favor of the copyright holder.101 These tilted scales effectively expand 
the zone of the copyright holder’s exclusive control and, 
correspondingly, constrict fair use.102 These tilted scales, in turn, 
permit copyright overreach.103 
A growing chorus of scholars criticize the Court’s labeling of 
fair use as an affirmative defense. Fair use is a defense, but it should 
not be an affirmative defense.104 As Professor Lydia Pallas Loren has 
argued, such labeling is “an error of statutory interpretation with 
seriously problematic First Amendment consequences.”105 Professor 
Loren offers a persuasive accounting of the legislative record, which 
by her review does not reflect an intent to treat fair use as an 
affirmative defense.106 
As a matter of statutory construction, fair use (codified in 
Section 107) is both a statutory right and a definitional limit on a 
copyright holder’s statutory rights (codified in Section 106).107 Section 
108 of the Copyright Act expressly acknowledges the “right of fair 
 
 101. See Sun, supra note 61, at 157 (“Many copyright holders have adopted 
an aggressive litigation strategy in order to deter the public from actively asserting its 
fair use right. By taking advantage of the user’s burden to prove fair use, many 
copyright holders have frequently made claims of infringement even in circumstances 
where the fair use defense would likely succeed.”). 
 102. See Snow, supra note 87, at 1791 (“The effect of assigning the burden of 
proof to fair users is to expand the scope of expression that copyright suppresses into 
protected fair-use expression. This is so because the burden penalizes the fair user 
when fact-finders face uncertainty over issues in the fair-use analysis: Although a use 
may in actuality be fair, if the fact-finder is uncertain on this point, the burden requires 
the copyright holder to win by default.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Lauren Gorab, A Fair Use to Remember: Restoring Application 
of the Fair Use Doctrine to Strengthen Copyright Law and Disarm Abusive Copyright 
Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 705 (2018) (“Currently, the application of fair 
use as an affirmative defense magnifies the doctrine’s inherent problems and makes 
copyright law hospitable to abusive copyright litigation.”). 
 104. See Loren, supra note 3, at 701 (“[C]alling fair use a ‘defense’ is entirely 
consistent with fair use being a component part of what shapes the rights of a 
copyright owner. Labeling something a ‘defense’ does not necessarily carry with it an 
obligation of proving the elements of the defense. It is the label of ‘affirmative 
defense’ that indicates the shift of the burden to the defendant.”). 
 105. Id. at 710. 
 106. See id. at 696–704; see also Snow, supra note 87, at 1788 (“[T]he 
Copyright Act never labels fair use an affirmative defense.”). 
 107. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107, with 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also Snow, supra 
note 3, at 163 (“Section 107 articulates the doctrine as the original fair-use 
jurisprudence portrays it—a doctrine that defines infringement: ‘[T]he fair use of a 
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
107)). 
618 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
use as provided by section 107.”108 The statute provides that Section 
106 rights are “[s]ubject to” Section 107 fair use.109 And the statute 
clarifies that Section 107 fair use “is not an infringement.”110 As 
Professor Loren argued, these “statutory sections seem to clearly 
support viewing fair use not as an affirmative defense but rather as 
part and parcel of what defines the rights of a copyright owner.”111 In 
other words, fair use defines the limits of infringement.112 And, as 
discussed above, fair use is not an infringing act to be tolerated or 
excused, but rather it is a use advancing the very purpose of copyright: 
promoting the progress of learning.113 Put differently, fair use is not an 
exception to infringement; rather, it is a use beyond the reach of the 
copyright holder’s exclusive zone of control.114 And by extension, as 
Professor Loren argued, “[i]f fair use is ‘not an infringement,’ then the 
plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of 
infringement without overcoming the argument that the use is a fair 
use.”115 Judge Stanley Birch echoed this point: “Logically then, how 
can it be said that fair use, which by definition is not an infringement, 
 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (“Nothing in this section in any way affects the 
right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 109. § 106 (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the 
following . . . .”). 
 110. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the 
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”) (emphasis added). 
 111. Loren, supra note 3, at 697. 
 112. See Snow, supra note 3, at 164 (“As the same sort of right held by a 
copyright holder, the fair-use right must compete with the copyright right. So by 
describing fair use as a competing right, Congress intimated its intent that fair use 
define the scope of the copyright right, rather than excuse an infringement of the 
copyright right.”). 
 113. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 62, at 11 (“To employ the fair-
use provisions of the copyright act is not to abuse the rights of the author or copyright 
owner; indeed, the very purpose of copyright is to advance knowledge and thus benefit 
the public welfare, which is exactly what fair use—properly employed—does.”). 
 114. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Jacobs, J., concurring) (“Fair use is not a permitted infringement; it lies wholly 
outside the domain protected by the author’s copyright.”); see also Loren, supra note 
3, at 698 (“The statutory language contradicts treating fair use as an exception: It is, 
‘not an infringement,’ instead a limitation on the scope of the rights granted to 
copyright owners.”). 
 115. Loren, supra note 3, at 698. 
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can be considered properly an affirmative defense in a copyright 
infringement action.”116  
Supreme Court dicta mischaracterizes fair use as technical 
infringement to be excused rather than recognizing it as an affirmative 
right of the user.117 And more than simply an affirmative statutory 
right, fair use is also a speech-protective doctrine.118 In Golan and 
Eldred, the Supreme Court emphasized that fair use, along with the 
idea/expression dichotomy, are “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations.”119 The Court in Harper & Row also noted that “the 
Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and 
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and 
comment traditionally afforded by fair use” are First Amendment 
protections.120 Fair use thus serves an important speech-protective 
function within copyright.121 The statutory privilege of copyright 
therefore should not overshadow constitutionally protected fair use.122 
Categorizing fair use as an affirmative defense weakens the speech-
protective shield.123 Denominating fair use as an affirmative defense 
devalues it as a First Amendment safeguard.124 This approach both 
 
 116. Birch, supra note 3, at 165–66. 
 117. See Snow, supra note 3, at 168; see also Birch, supra note 3, at 165 
(arguing “it should be manifest that to denominate ‘fair use’ as merely an affirmative 
defense is a mischaracterization of constitutional dimensions”). 
 118. See Snow, supra note 87, at 1782 (“Although the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a defendant’s fair-use expression should receive constitutional 
protection as speech, the Court has failed to recognize that the burden of proving the 
unfairness of a defendant’s use should rest with the party seeking to suppress that 
expression—the copyright holder.”).  
 119. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)). 
 120. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985). 
 121. See Golan, 565 U.S. at 329 (rejecting heightened scrutiny “[g]iven the 
‘speech-protective purposes and safeguards’ embraced by copyright law” (quoting 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003))); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This 
Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 
YALE L.J. 535, 548 (2004) (“Indeed, one can read Eldred and other cases to hold that 
fair use is constitutionally required.”). 
 122. See Rosenfield, supra note 21, at 807 (“[C]onstitutionally protected fair 
use has priority over the mere statutory privilege accorded to the copyright owner by 
the permissive and non-mandatory action of the Congress in enacting copyright 
legislation under the copyright clause.”). 
 123. See Snow, supra note 3, at 173 (“[T]he burden of proof matters. It has 
weakened the strength of fair use.”). 
 124. See Gorab, supra note 103, at 705 (“Applying fair use as an affirmative 
defense misplaces the burden on the defendant and makes copyright law legally and 
procedurally hospitable to abusive copyright litigation.”); Loren, supra note 3, at 696 
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undermines the constitutional dimensions of fair use as a speech-
protective safeguard and the statutory dimensions of fair use as a 
right.125 Consonant with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the burden of proof should be on the party seeking to 
restrict speech.126 
Fair use thus needs a course correction.127 Fair use should be 
reclassified as simply a defense. Reanimated as a speech-protective 
doctrine, a defendant would be required to plead and assert the defense 
of fair use but need not carry the burden of proving fair use.128 The 
burden of proving a prima facie case of infringement would remain 
with the copyright holder. As Judge Birch suggested:  
[A] defendant in an infringement action should have the initial burden of 
stating in its defensive pleadings that it was asserting its right of fair use, 
thereby placing the plaintiff copyright owner on notice. After satisfying that 
initial burden of coming forward, the burden to establish infringement upon 
 
(“As an important balance in copyright that the Court has repeatedly pointed to when 
considering separate First Amendment challenges to copyright law, relegating fair use 
to the status of an affirmative defense weakens its significant balancing role.”); Sun, 
supra note 61, at 156 (“[T]reating fair use merely as an affirmative defense may raise 
questions as to whether a user’s fair use right can still be adequately protected.”). 
 125. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 
(11th Cir. 2001) (Birch, J.) (“I believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative 
right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in 
the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright.”); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, 
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (Birch, J.) (“Although the traditional 
approach is to view ‘fair use’ as an affirmative defense, this writer, speaking only for 
himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright 
Act of 1976. Originally, as a judicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was 
an infringement that was excused—this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. 
As a statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the 
passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infringement to 
be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right. Regardless of how fair use 
is viewed, it is clear that the burden of proving fair use is always on the putative 
infringer.”). 
 126. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“[T]he burden of 
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.”). 
 127. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“Even if, as Universal urges, fair use is classified as an ‘affirmative defense,’ we 
hold—for the purposes of the DMCA—fair use is uniquely situated in copyright law 
so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative defenses. We conclude that 
because 17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is ‘authorized 
by the law’ and a copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before 
sending a takedown notification under § 512(c).”). 
 128. See Birch, supra note 3, at 166. 
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the plaintiff would include the burden to negate fair use—since a fair use, 
by statutory definition, is not an infringement.129 
Where reasonable minds differ on a particular question, 
allocating burdens of proof can profoundly affect the outcome of the 
case.130 As the Supreme Court observed over half a century ago, “[i]n 
all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may 
be decisive of the outcome.”131 Burdens of proof assign a winner if the 
evidence is in equipoise. The Court has recognized that requiring a 
speaker to prove the protected nature of the speech can be unduly 
burdensome.132 The speaker’s “difficulties of adducing legal proofs,” 
the Court opined, risks “self-censorship” and “dampens the vigor and 
limits the variety of public debate.”133 Copyright is a goal-oriented 
statutory product. Fair use is a statutory right134 and a speech-
protective safeguard.135 The policy of fair use suggests the scales 
should favor the fair user.136 The burden should rest on the party 
attempting to suppress speech.137 As a matter of statutory construction 
 
 129. Id.; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 83 (2001) (proposing “once the defendant 
shows a colorable claim of fair use, the burden should pass to the copyright holder to 
prove that the defendant has copied more than necessary for effective speech and that 
the defendant’s use is likely to harm the actual or potential market for the copyright 
holder’s work”); Volokh, supra note 96, at 721 (suggesting the copyright holder 
should “have to bear the burden of proving that the speaker’s use was 
nontransformative”). 
 130. See Snow, supra note 87, at 1803 (“The inherent uncertainty of fair-use 
facts implies that the burden more often than not determines the loser in a fair-use 
fight.”). 
 131. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). 
 132. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (“Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects 
the right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 135. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 329 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 219 (2003).  
 136. Cf. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986) 
(“[W]here the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution 
requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech. To ensure that true speech 
on matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law 
presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks 
damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.”); see also Volokh, 
supra note 96, at 721 (“Placing the burden of proving fair use on the defendant is thus 
likely to deter considerably more speech than would placing the burden of proving 
unfair use on the plaintiff.”). 
 137. See Snow, supra note 87, at 1782 (“Although the Supreme Court has 
recognized that a defendant’s fair-use expression should receive constitutional 
protection as speech, the Court has failed to recognize that the burden of proving the 
622 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
and sound public policy, the copyright holder should have the burden 
to prove that a use is unfair.138 
II. OPERATIONALIZING FAIR USE DECISIONS 
Procedurally, fair use questions can be decided at a number of 
different stages during the life cycle of a case. Courts can consider 
questions of fair use on a motion to dismiss, on a motion for summary 
judgment, on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and on 
appeal.139 And because fair use presents a factual question, it also may 
be decided by a jury.140 
Under modern procedural rules, fair use can be decided by the 
court in ruling on dispositive motions. The district court sometimes 
considers fair use on a motion to dismiss. (Technically, if fair use is 
denominated an affirmative defense, the proper motion is a 12(c) 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, rather than a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.141 But in either case, it is a 
dispositive motion before discovery.142) As the Seventh Circuit 
explained, “[w]hen a defendant raises a fair use defense claiming his 
 
unfairness of a defendant’s use should rest with the party seeking to suppress that 
expression-the copyright holder.”). 
 138. See Rosenfield, supra note 21, at 804 (“Once fair use has been properly 
vested with its appropriate constitutional status, the burden of proof shifts to the 
copyright proprietor to prove that an alleged infringement is not protected as a fair use 
under the first and ninth amendments. This allocation of the burden of proof is an 
appropriate adjustment between a statutory privilege (copyright) and a 
constitutionally guaranteed right (fair use).”). 
 139. See discussion infra notes 217–219. 
 140. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW 480 (1985) (“The question of whether fair use is available has consistently been 
held to be one of fact, thus entitling one to a jury or, where there are no genuine issues 
of material fact at issue, summary judgment.”) (citations omitted). 
 141. See Galvin v. Ill. Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (N.D. 
Ill. 2015) (cautioning that “the proper heading for motions on the basis of affirmative 
defenses [like fair use] is Rule 12(c) because an affirmative defense is external to the 
complaint,” rather than a Rule 12(b)(6)); see also Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Though district courts have granted 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions on the basis of affirmative defenses and this court has affirmed 
those dismissals, we have repeatedly cautioned that the proper heading for such 
motions is Rule 12(c), since an affirmative defense is external to the complaint.”). 
 142. See Effie Film, LLC v. Murphy, 932 F. Supp. 2d 538, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“In deciding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion the court applies the same standard 
as it would in deciding a Rule 12(b) motion—a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to 
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”), aff’d, 564 F. App’x 631 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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or her work is a parody, a court can often decide the merits of the claim 
without discovery or a trial.”143 But courts are often reluctant to grant 
such relief, which would dismiss a copyright suit before the discovery 
phase.144 The Harper & Row Court instructed lower courts to have 
“facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors.”145 Fair use 
is a case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiry. And to complete a fair use 
analysis, the court usually must rely on undisputed facts or make 
factual findings.146  
Pre-discovery dispositive motions are often limited to those 
instances where the evidence needed to decide fair use is already in 
the record.147 A case is ripe for resolution on a motion to dismiss if 
additional discovery of facts to support a claim is unnecessary. 
Additional discovery is often unnecessary when the court is able to 
conduct a side-by-side comparison of the works at issue.148 The 
Seventh Circuit, for instance, instructs that a trial court may decide 
fair use, thereby “avoiding the burdens of discovery and trial,” when 
“the only two pieces of evidence needed to decide the question of fair 
use” are already before the court.149  
In Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., the district court 
adopted this approach to fair use and resolved the case before 
 
 143. Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 692. 
 144. See Nichols v. Club for Growth Action, 235 F. Supp. 3d 289, 295 (D.D.C. 
2017) (“‘Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,’ and determinations of fair use 
involve a fact-intensive review of the record. Therefore, fair use is not traditionally 
decided on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985))); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 
522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The posture of this case is unusual because the district court 
decided the fair use issue on a motion to dismiss. However, the district court’s 
resolution of the fair use issue at the motion to dismiss stage was proper.”). 
 145. Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 146. See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) (“[I]n light of a court’s narrow inquiry [on a motion to dismiss] . . . and limited 
access to all potentially relevant and material facts needed to undertake the [fair use] 
analysis, courts rarely analyze fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion.”). 
 147. Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 690. 
 148. See, e.g., Adjmi v. DLT Entm’t Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (deciding fair use on a 12(c) motion because “[c]ourts in this Circuit have 
resolved motions to dismiss on fair use grounds in this way: comparing the original 
work to an alleged parody, in light of applicable law”); Arrow Prods., LTD. v. 
Weinstein Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding “discovery 
would not provide any additional relevant information in this inquiry” because “[a]ll 
that is necessary for the court to make a determination as to fair use are the two films 
at issue”). 
 149. Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d at 689–90. 
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discovery.150 Plaintiff Matthew Lombardo was the author of Who’s 
Holiday!, a comedic, off-Broadway play that used the characters, plot, 
and setting of the Dr. Seuss book How the Grinch Stole Christmas!151 
In the fall of 2016, Dr. Seuss Enterprises sent a series of cease and 
desist letters alleging that Lombardo’s play infringed Dr. Seuss’s 
Grinch.152 In December 2016, Lombardo sought a declaratory 
judgment that his play was a fair use and did not infringe the Dr. Seuss 
book.153 The trial court agreed: “the Play is a parody of Grinch, and 
thus transformative.”154 The court concluded that discovery was 
unnecessary in this case: “although discovery might yield additional 
information about [Lombardo’s] intent, such information is 
unnecessary to resolve the fair use issue; all that is needed is the 
parties’ pleadings, copies of Grinch and the Play, and the relevant case 
law.”155 The court concluded that the record abundantly demonstrated 
fair use, thus it was proper to resolve the question before discovery.156 
But deciding fair use before discovery is the exception, not the rule.157 
If the case is not resolved on a pre-discovery dispositive motion, the 
parties then engage in the discovery phase.158 
 
 150. See Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 504 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“No such discovery is necessary in this case. Numerous courts in 
this district have resolved the issue of fair use on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings by conducting a side-by-side comparison of the works at issue.”), aff’d, 729 
F. App’x 131 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 151. Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 502. 
 152. Id. at 504. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 507. Cf. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 256 F. 
Supp. 3d 1099, 1102, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
a “mashup” of Star Trek and Dr. Seuss, titled Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go!, as a 
fair use parody), 372 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1125 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (granting defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of fair use), appeal 
docketed, No. 19-55348 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2019); see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. 
v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming preliminary 
injunction on the basis that a book about the O.J. Simpson murder trial, written and 
illustrated in the style of Dr. Seuss and titled The Cat NOT in the Hat!, was not a 
parody or a fair use). 
 155. Lombardo, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 505. 
 156. See id. at 513 (“[T]he fourth factor weighs strongly in favor of a finding 
of fair use, and in considering all of the four factors together, I hold that the Play 
constitutes fair use.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Roe v. Bernabei & Wachtel PLLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d 89, 99 n.8 
(D.D.C. 2015) (“This [fair use] defense is premature and the Court will not address it 
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”); Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316 (S.D. 
Fla. 2012) (“[T]he general rule [is] that fair use defenses are not ripe for determination 
before the summary judgment stage.”). 
 158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
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After the close of discovery, summary judgment is proper if the 
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as matter of law.”159 In other words, when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, fair use may be decided by courts on a motion 
for summary judgment.160 In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Productions, for example, the district court concluded defendant’s 
“reproduction of Mattel’s copyrighted Barbie was fair use” and 
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.161 The trial court 
concluded that no triable issues of fact existed on whether defendant’s 
use of Mattel’s Barbie doll constitutes fair use and no reasonable jury 
would disagree.162 The trial court reasoned that the jury could only 
conclude that defendant’s works were fair use because (1) his use was 
a parody meant to criticize Barbie, (2) he only copied what was 
necessary for his parodic purpose, and (3) his photographs could not 
affect the market demand for Barbie products.163 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed.164  
But if there are genuine issues of material fact, a jury can be 
empaneled to decide questions of fair use.165 The Seventh Amendment 
 
 159. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
247–48 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56, the opposing 
party must establish that there is a triable issue of material fact. To carry its burden, 
the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts [in question].” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 
 160. See, e.g., N.J. Media Grp. v. Pirro, 74 F. Supp. 3d 605, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (“Although fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, courts in the Second 
Circuit have ‘on a number of occasions’ resolved fair use determinations at the 
summary judgment stage where there are no genuine issues of material fact.” (quoting 
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998))); 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he court may resolve issues of fair use at the summary judgment stage where 
there are no genuine issues of material fact as to such issues.”); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where material facts are not in 
dispute, fair use is appropriately decided on summary judgment.”). 
 161. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 800. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (“We conclude that Forsythe’s use of Mattel’s copyrighted Barbie 
constitutes fair use and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”). 
 165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38. The right to jury trial is preserved by the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution and embodied in Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A party who wants a trial by jury must file and serve a timely written 
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provides, in part, that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved.”166 The Supreme Court has long emphasized that “[t]he 
right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the 
English common law when the Amendment was adopted.”167 Fair use 
is frequently characterized as an “equitable rule of reason.”168 But fair 
use is not an equitable doctrine, rather it is a legal doctrine.169 As Judge 
Pierre Leval has noted, “Fair use was a judge-made utilitarian limit on 
a statutory right. It balances the social benefit of a transformative 
secondary use against injury to the incentives of authorship.”170 In 
response to the often-repeated refrain that fair use is a creature of 
equity, Judge Leval flatly stated, “Historically this notion is 
incorrect.”171 Historically, common law courts enlisted juries to decide 
 
demand for a jury trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b). And failure to make the required demand 
results in a waiver of the jury trial right. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d).  
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 167. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) 
(quoting Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)). 
 168. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 
n.31 (1984) (“[S]ince the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally 
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided 
on its own facts.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), as reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680)). 
 169. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 140, at 5 (1985) (“It is therefore incorrect to 
characterize fair use as a child of equity. Rather, it was the child of an English 
jurisprudence that sought to accommodate a statutory scheme, the goal of which was 
to ‘encourage . . . learned men to compose and write useful books,’ by allowing a 
second author to use, under certain conditions, a portion of a prior author’s work, 
where that second author would himself produce a work promoting the expressed 
goal.” (quoting 8 Anne c.19 § 1 (1710))). 
 170. Leval, supra note 28, at 1127.  
 171. Id. See also Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1456–58 (1997) (discussing the “‘equitable rule of reason’ 
canard”). 
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questions of fair use.172 As a legal defense, fair use may be—and often 
is—decided by a jury.173  
After a jury trial, the losing party may file a Rule 50 motion to 
have the jury verdict overturned.174 The court may grant a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law if no “reasonable jury” could find for a 
party on a given issue.175 The Supreme Court has confirmed that the 
trial court may “remove cases or issues from the jury’s consideration 
‘when the facts are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular 
result.’”176 Thus the verdict-loser would argue that, as a matter of law, 
there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.177 
In ruling on a Rule 50 motion, the court must consider the entire 
record and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict-
 
 172. See, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B.) (Lord 
Mansfield, C.J.) (“In all these [copyright] cases [where defendant had altered 
underlying work] the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration 
be colourable or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or 
not.”); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623–24 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, 
J.) (characterizing inquiry into whether use of copyrighted material is permissible as 
“question of fact to come to a jury” (quoting Lord Mansfield, C.J., in Sayre, 102 Eng. 
Rep. 139)). See generally William Patry, The Right to a Jury in Copyright Cases, 29 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139 (1981). 
 173. See, e.g., Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he first 
question the jury would be asked to answer: ‘whether [Point Break Live!] was a fair 
use by way of a parody of the original movie Point Break.’”); Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the propriety 
of the jury instructions in three respects: substantial similarity, fair use, and 
willfulness). 
 174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b). Rule 50(a) establishes the procedure for an 
initial motion for judgment as a matter of law—formerly called a motion for a directed 
verdict—made during the trial and prior to submission of the case to the jury. Rule 
50(b) establishes the procedure for a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 
law—formerly called a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment 
n.o.v.)—made after the case has been submitted to the jury.  
 175. Under Rule 50, a trial court should grant a judgment as a matter of law 
only when “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 50(a). 
 176. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 448 (2000) (citation omitted). 
 177. The Supreme Court has long held that whether the evidence is sufficient 
to support submitting an issue to the jury is a legal determination, and that entry of 
judgment under Rule 50(b) does not contravene the Seventh Amendment. See Neely 
v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322, 330 (1967); see also Ohio-Sealy 
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Rule 50(b) 
serves the important purpose of ensuring that a motion for judgment n.o.v. is used 
only to invite the district court to reexamine its decision not to direct a verdict as a 
matter of law, and not, in contravention of the Seventh Amendment, to reexamine 
facts found by the jury.”). 
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winner.178 The court may not, however, make credibility 
determinations, re-weigh the evidence, or draw inferences from the 
facts.179 As the Supreme Court explained, “[c]redibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of 
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a 
judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for 
a directed verdict.”180 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment or 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the question is whether a 
reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion based on the 
evidence. In other words, the question is whether the evidence is so 
one-sided that one party must win as a matter of law.181 
In Corbello v. DeVito, the district court granted defendants’ Rule 
50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the question 
of fair use.182 Rex Woodard was an attorney and avid fan of The Four 
Seasons band; Tommy DeVito is a founding member of The Four 
Seasons.183 Woodard assisted DeVito in writing his unpublished 
autobiography Tommy DeVito—Then and Now.184 Plaintiff Donna 
Corbello, the widow and heir of Rex Woodard, sued DeVito and 
others when they used the unpublished autobiography to develop the 
screenplay for Jersey Boys, a hit musical based on The Four 
Seasons.185 After a fifteen-day trial, the jury found the play Jersey Boys 
infringed the autobiography and was not a fair use.186 The court 
 
 178. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(“[T]he standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors’ the standard for judgment 
as a matter of law, such that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’ It therefore follows 
that, in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review 
all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility 
determinations or weigh the evidence.”) (citations omitted). 
 179. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 252–53. 
 182. See Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1068 (D. Nev. 2017) 
(“The Court has closely examined the evidence under the relevant standards and 
concludes Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the fair use 
issue.”). 
 183. Id. at 1059. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. at 1068 (“The jury found: (1) Tommy DeVito did not grant 
Defendants an implied nonexclusive license to use the Work to create the Play; (2) 
the Play infringed the Work; (3) the use of the Work in the Play did not constitute fair 
use; (4) 10% of the success of the Play was attributable to infringement of the Work; 
and (5) the remaining Defendants were liable for direct infringement (as opposed to 
vicarious or contributory infringement).”). 
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disagreed: “A finding of no fair use, where such a tiny part of the 
creative elements of a biographical work with little to no market value 
were copied, and where the use was significantly transformative, 
would hinder rather than further the purposes of copyright.”187 Thus, 
the trial court granted defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and overturned the jury verdict.188 
A losing party has the right to appeal an adverse judgment to the 
court of appeals.189 The standard of review on appeal turns on whether 
the appellate court is reviewing a question of law or a question of fact. 
The old legal saw is that purely legal questions are reviewed de novo 
and purely factual questions are reviewed deferentially.190 And for 
mixed questions of law and fact—it depends.191  
Questions of fact, as Professor Henry Monaghan noted, “respond 
to inquiries about who, when, what, and where.”192 Historical facts 
involve questions that are answered or proved “at least to some 
 
 187. Id. at 1077. 
 188. See id. In an amicus brief filed in Oracle America v. Google, a group of 
law professors note that the Corbello decision is unusual in that Corbello is the only 
“other case . . . [in which] a court overturned a jury verdict of fair use.” Brief for 
Copyright Law Professors Pamela Samuelson & Clark Asay as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendant-Cross Appellant at 6 n.4, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 
F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Nos. 2017-1118, 2017-1202), 2018 WL 3031679. The 
Corbello case is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. Corbello v. DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Nev. 2017), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-16337 (9th Cir. Jun. 29, 2017). 
 189. A notice of appeal generally must be filed in district court within 30 days 
after entry of judgment, or within 14 days after filing of a timely notice of appeal by 
any other party. See FED. R. APP. P. 4. And, note that without a renewed judgment as 
a matter of law, an appellate court is barred from considering challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (“[W]e hold that since respondent failed 
to renew its preverdict motion as specified in Rule 50(b), there was no basis for review 
of respondent’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge in the Court of Appeals.”). 
 190. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. 
at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 965 (2018) (noting minimal deference for 
questions of law). 
 191. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (defining 
mixed questions of law and fact as “questions in which the historical facts are admitted 
or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy 
the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to 
the established facts is or is not violated”). 
 192. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
229, 235 (1985); see also James B. Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 147, 151–52 (1890) (“The question of whether a thing be a fact or not, is the 
question of whether it is, whether it exists, whether it be true. All inquiries into the 
truth, the reality, the actuality of things are inquiries into the fact about them.”). 
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significant degree of probability, by inferences from evidence.”193 
Factual findings do not require judicial determination of broad, 
generalized governing principles and instead apply laymen’s “logic 
and human experience to the received physical, documentary, and 
testimonial evidence.”194 A finding of fact is “independent of or 
anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect.”195  
Declarations of law, on the other hand, are, as Professor Martin 
Louis noted, “fact-free general principles that are applicable to all, or 
at least to many, disputes and not simply to the one sub judice.”196 
“Law” is usually defined as a statement of the general principle or rule, 
conceived in advance, awaiting application to particular facts as they 
may arise.197 Law consists of “those rules and standards of general 
application by which the state regulates human affairs.”198 Law is a 
general proposition, whereas fact is a case-specific inquiry.  
Questions of fact call for proof, whereas matters of law are 
established not by evidentiary showing but by intellectual 
abstraction.199 Facts are “descriptive,” rather than “dispositive.”200 
Facts answer the is question, whereas laws answer the ought question. 
But facts and laws are not hermetically distinct concepts. Facts and 
laws are better understood as ends of a spectrum.201 Between the ends 
of the continuum are questions that present a mix of law and fact.202 
Mixed questions involve “the application-of-legal-standard-to-
 
 193. HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 7 (3d ed. 2018). 
 194. Id. at 7–8. 
 195. Louis Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 
241 (1955). 
 196. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority 
Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the 
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993–94 n.3 
(1986). 
 197. See Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. 
REV. 111, 112 (1924).  
 198. Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 
901 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
 199. See Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1942) 
(“A question of fact usually calls for proof. A question of law usually calls for 
argument.”). 
 200. Id. at 1329.  
 201. See Jaffe, supra note 195, at 239–40. 
 202. See EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 193, at 13 (“Legal principles that 
result in . . . mixed questions on appeal are generally broad, often fluid, sometimes 
common sense concepts that cannot be ‘reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” (quoting 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996))). 
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fact.”203 Questions of negligence or reasonableness of conduct are 
often denominated mixed questions of law and fact.204 
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that “[m]ixed questions 
are not all alike.”205 And hence mixed questions are not all subject to 
the same standard of review.206 Some questions require “courts to 
expound on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a 
broad legal standard,” and in such instances, the Court teaches that 
“appellate courts should typically review a decision de novo.”207 But 
in other instances “mixed questions immerse courts in case-specific 
factual issues—compelling them to marshal and weigh evidence, 
make credibility judgments,” for which “appellate courts should 
usually review a decision with deference.”208 The Court has 
emphasized the original factfinder’s “superiority” in resolving such 
issues.209  
Mixed questions thus present a policy question about which 
decider is better. As the Supreme Court acknowledged, when an “issue 
falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact,” the standard of appellate review often reflects which 
“judicial actor is better positioned” to make the decision.210 Here, the 
relative competencies of judge and jury are a functional 
consideration.211 In considering the relative skills of judge and jury, 
 
 203. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (quoting United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995)). 
 204. See, e.g., Frederick Green, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 15 HARV. 
L. REV. 271, 271 (1902) (noting how the legal community often refers to these 
questions). 
 205. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at 
Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018) (noting that mixed questions sometimes 
require more legal analysis). 
 206. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“Merely characterizing an issue as a mixed question of law and fact does not 
dictate the applicable standard of review.”), cert. granted, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. 
Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956). 
 207. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 967 (discussing the standard of 
review for mixed questions that contains significant legal questions). 
 208. Id. (noting that other mixed questions depend heavily on the individual 
facts of a case as found by the factfinders).  
 209. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–76 (1985) (discussing the 
reasons why a trial court’s determination of facts should be given deference on 
appeal). 
 210. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (explaining how the Supreme 
Court decides what standard of review it will apply to a particular case). 
 211. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) 
(finding judges better suited to interpret patent claims based on the “relative 
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the Court reminds us that the standard of review for a mixed question 
turns on “whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual 
work.”212 Factual work typically receives deferential review, whereas 
primarily legal analyses are reviewed de novo. 
Courts must analyze the nature of a “mixed” question to 
determine whether it is one in which legal questions predominate or 
one in which factual questions predominate—and therefore what 
standard of review should apply.213 When a mixed question “involves 
developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases,” the Court 
teaches that such decisions typically warrant de novo review.214 On the 
other hand, when the mixed question “immerse[s] courts in case-
specific factual issues,” which involve weighing evidence and 
addressing “multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly 
resist generalization,” such decisions call for deference.215 In other 
words, when a mixed question of fact and law weighs heavily on 
“case-specific factual issues,” deferential review is appropriate.216 
So how is fair use reviewed on appeal? Dispositive motions are 
reviewed de novo. This means that on appeal fair use decisions made 
by the trial court—either on a motion to dismiss,217 a motion for 
summary judgment,218 or a motion for judgment as a matter of law219—
will be reviewed de novo. But what about a jury verdict on fair use?220 
 
interpretive skills of judges and juries” and the statutory policies “furthered by the 
allocation”). 
 212. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 967 (restating the test that courts use 
to determine the standard for reviewing mixed questions). 
 213. See id. at 968 (affirming “clear error” review because the inquiry under 
consideration “is about as factual sounding as any mixed question gets”). 
 214. Id. at 967.  
 215. Id. (stating courts should apply a deferential standard of review for issues 
that turn heavily case-specific facts). 
 216. Id. (discussing the standard of review appellate courts use for mixed 
questions that are fact-dependent).  
 217. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.”). 
 218. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We review a 
grant of summary judgment de novo.”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley 
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As there are no genuine issues of material 
fact here, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo.”). 
 219. See Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We review 
de novo a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law filed pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).”). 
 220. Cf. 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:160 (2019) (“Fair use determinations, 
whether after a bench or jury trial, must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard, or where there is a general jury verdict, not reviewed at all under the 
Reexamination Clause.”). 
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The Harper & Row Court denominated fair use a mixed question of 
law and fact.221 Fair use is a mixed question because it is a law-
application question. Applying the law to the facts, the factfinder is 
asked to decide if the defendant’s use of the work is fair or not.222 If 
fair use requires a “neat comparison of fact to law,”223 deference 
should apply because such factual determinations are best made by the 
factfinder. On the other hand, de novo review is appropriate if fair use 
is not answered by the facts of the individual case but rather by 
reference to the objectives and examples in the statute—specifically, 
if the legal analysis can be applied to multiple disputes “and not simply 
to the one sub judice.”224 The open question is whether fair use, as a 
mixed question, should be reviewed deferentially or de novo.225  
In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that because “fair use is equitable in nature, it would seem 
to be a question for the judge, not the jury, to decide.”226 The circuit 
court noted the lack of clear guidance on the question: “[T]he Supreme 
Court has never clarified whether and to what extent the jury is to play 
a role in the fair use analysis.”227 Recognizing the mixed nature of the 
fair use inquiry, the Federal Circuit deferred to the jury’s “historical 
 
 221. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 
560 (1985) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”); see also NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 13.05 (“Fair use is said to constitute a mixed issue of 
law and fact, but what facts will be sufficient to raise this defense in any given case is 
not easily answered.”). 
 222. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 223. Cf. EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 193, at 8. 
 224. Louis, supra note 196, at 993–94 n.3. 
 225. Scholars, like Professor Ned Snow, argue that fair use should be a 
question of fact for the jury and reviewed deferentially on appeal. See Ned Snow, Who 
Decides Fair Use-Judge or Jury?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 275, 280 (2019) [hereinafter 
Snow, Who Decides] (arguing “juries are better positioned to decide whether a use is 
fair” because these decisions “draw from cultural norms and social values” and 
“[s]uch subjectivity is well suited for the heterogeneous perspective of jurors, who 
come from all walks of life and reflect a diversity of opinion, much more so than a 
panel of homogeneous judges”); Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional 
Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 
497 (2010) [hereinafter Snow, Judges Playing Jury] (articulating three reasons why a 
jury should decide fair use: “[t]he first and chief reason is that the characteristic of 
plurality among jurors is preferable to the singularity of the judge in determining 
whether a use is fair; the second is that the Seventh Amendment mandates these issues 
be resolved by a jury; and the third is that the public appears to prefer the jury to the 
judge”). 
 226. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956). 
 227. Id. 
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facts” but reviewed de novo the “ultimate question of fair use” on the 
ground that it is “legal in nature.”228 Viewing the jury verdict “as 
advisory only,” the Federal Circuit independently weighed the fair use 
factors and “conclude[d] that allowing Google to commercially 
exploit Oracle’s work will not advance the purposes of copyright in 
this case.”229  
Fair use is contestable. Reasonable minds can—and often do—
differ on questions of fair use.230 There is little shared consensus on 
the nature of fair use.231 That the fair use factors “do not speak with 
univocal clarity,” according to David Nimmer, “can be appreciated 
simply from the fact” that the fair use cases that made it to the Supreme 
Court have “produced divergent responses from the judges and 
justices at each level.”232 Reasonable minds often differ over the 
 
 228. Id. at 1194–96. 
 229. Id. at 1196, 1210. Google’s petition for rehearing en banc before the 
Federal Circuit was denied on August 28, 2018. See generally Order Denying 
Defendant-Cross Appellant Google, Inc. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Oracle Am., 
886 F.3d 1179. On November 15, 2019, Google’s petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court was granted. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Oracle Am., 886 F.3d 
1179, cert. granted, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956). 
 230. See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 62, at 3 (“In short, one cannot 
expect universal agreement concerning what is and what is not fair use—even by the 
courts, where rulings on fair use are often overturned on appeal and decisions 
frequently have strong dissenting opinions.”); see also Snow, Who Decides, supra 
note 225, at 331 (“[F]air use raises questions over which reasonable minds often 
disagree—normative questions that concern whether a use should be permissible.”); 
Snow, Judges Playing Jury, supra note 225, at 499 (“[T]he indeterminate nature of 
fair use requires judgments that turn on individual social values and life 
experiences.”). 
 231. See Leval, supra note 28, at 1106–07 (“Judges do not share a consensus 
on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions provide little basis for predicting later 
ones. Reversals and divided courts are commonplace. The opinions reflect widely 
differing notions of the meaning of fair use.”) (citations omitted); see also Ned Snow, 
Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (2011) (“Views of fairness 
often are held in the extremity. Fairness turns on social value judgments that vary with 
extremity from person to person, so opinions on whether a use is fair may vary as 
widely as the disparity of life experiences between very different people.”). But see 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009) 
(“The copyright fair use caselaw is more coherent and more predictable than many 
commentators seem to believe. Fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns, or 
what this Article calls policy-relevant clusters.”); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 49 (2012) (“This Article demonstrates that the uncertainty 
critique is somewhat overblown: an empirical analysis of the case law shows that, 
while there are many shades of gray in fair use litigation, there are also consistent 
patterns that can assist individuals, businesses, and lawyers in assessing the merits of 
particular claims to fair use protection.”). 
 232. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 13.05 n.25.2.  
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fairness quotient of a particular use.233 If fair use is a question of fact, 
judicial minds should defer to the jury’s factfinding. But if fair use is 
a question of law, judicial minds can decide anew and need not defer 
to the jury’s factfinding. As explored below, the fact/law distinction is 
but a smokescreen that obscures the policy question underneath: for a 
question of fair use—on which reasonable minds can (and often) 
differ—who should decide? Part III explores why it matters who 
decides such questions. 
III. EVALUATING WHY IT MATTERS WHO DECIDES 
The influence—if not the command—of the Seventh 
Amendment has long guided the allocation of decision-making 
authority within the court system.234 The Seventh Amendment reflects 
a federal policy that favors juries as arbiters of fact and courts as 
arbiters of law.235 Notwithstanding this preference, the allocation of 
decision-making authority is ultimately a political question of power 
allocation.236 This policy question is obscured by the fact/law 
distinction. 
The right to a jury reflects the core values of the Framers: a 
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.237 As 
 
 233. See, e.g., Bracha, supra note 33, at 1859 (“Fair use cases that make it up 
the judicial hierarchy are often reversed and sometimes re-reversed.”). 
 234. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 
(1958) (“An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil 
common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under 
the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the 
decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.”). 
 235. The Seventh Amendment states that in “Suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. VII. 
 236. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and 
the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 60 (1977) (suggesting “the right 
to a civil jury trial in the federal courts has, from its inception, represented an issue of 
power allocation”). 
 237. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 
1131, 1190 (1991) (“The jury summed up—indeed embodied—the ideals of 
populism, federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of 
Rights.”); AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 55 (1998) (“It is almost impossible 
to exaggerate the jury’s importance in the constitutional design. No idea was more 
central to the Bill of Rights—indeed, to America’s distinctive regime of government 
of the people, by the people, and for the people.”). 
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Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “[t]he system of the jury, as it is 
understood in America, appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a 
consequence of the sovereignty of the people, as universal suffrage.”238 
The right to a jury has been lauded as the “most stunning and 
successful experiment in direct popular sovereignty in all history.”239  
While there are those who view the jury as the common sense of 
the community,240 the jury has long been a controversial institution.241 
Professor John Guinther remarked that “for each advocate of the jury 
throughout its long history in America, there seems to have been a 
matching opponent.”242 Some view the jury as a cornerstone of 
democratic self-government, a safeguard against incompetent or 
oppressive judges, and a way for the people to have an active role in 
the process of justice.243 Others view the jury as capricious, irrational, 
inefficient, emotional, and incompetent to decide complex cases.244 
Such criticisms of the jury system were known to the Framers.245 
Notwithstanding the jury’s imperfections, the Framers depended upon 
the jury to be an important check on government.246 The Framers were 
 
 238. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310 (Francis Bower 
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1976) (1840). 
 239. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing 
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2006). Judge Young also observed: 
“Properly constrained by its duty to follow the law, the requirement of jury unanimity, 
and evidentiary rules, the American jury has served the republic well for over two 
hundred years.” Id.  
 240. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the 
American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 435–36, 466 (1999). 
 241. See Michael D. Green & Ashley DiMuzio, Cardozo and the Civil Jury, 
34 TOURO L. REV. 183, 186 (2018). Mark Twain is quoted as saying, “The jury system 
puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity 
and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system because it 
was good a thousand years ago.” Id. at 186–87 n.18 (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING 
IT 247 (Am. Pub. & F.G. Gilman & Co. 1872)). 
 242. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (Facts on File Publ’ns, 1988). 
 243. See, e.g., id. at xiii–xxviii; Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil 
Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062, 1067, 1072 (1964). 
 244. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE 
POLITICS OF REFORM 4, 9–10, 12 (1995); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, 
Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1498–99 
(2003); see also Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 
950, 950–51 (1970) (proposing abolition of jury trial in civil cases). 
 245. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American 
Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 399 (1999). 
 246. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (“The trial 
by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep 
interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great 
jealousy.”). 
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wary of accumulations of power in the same hands—including within 
the judiciary.247 Thomas Jefferson considered trial by a jury “as the 
only anchor . . . yet imagined by man, by which a government can be 
held to the principles of its constitution.”248 John Adams highlighted 
the “important boundary between the power of the court and that of 
the jury.”249 And Alexander Hamilton envisioned the jury as “a 
security against corruption” of judges.250  
The Framers, as Justice William Rehnquist noted, considered the 
jury a vital “bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too 
precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, 
to that of the judiciary.”251 The abrogation of the right to trial by jury—
one of the colonists’ principal grievances against the Crown—was 
specifically included among the indictments against George III in the 
Declaration of Independence.252 The jury was seen as an essential 
protection against government abuses.253 And a prominent objection to 
the proposed Constitution—“well-nigh preventing its 
ratification”254—was the omission of a guarantee of the right to trial 
by jury in civil cases.255 Hamilton spoke to this objection in The 
 
 247. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
 248. 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861). 
 249. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 253 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) (noting the “important boundary 
between the power of the court and that of the jury”). 
 250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
 251. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). See also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh 
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 709 (1973). 
 252. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“For 
depriving us in many cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury . . . .”); see also 
Harrington, supra note 245, at 395 (“The denial of jury trials became a major source 
of friction between the colonists and the English government in the years leading to 
the Revolution.”). 
 253. See Harrington, supra note 245, at 393 (stating that the jury in England 
was key to protecting against government abuse); id. at 396 (“For the colonists, the 
jury had become an important weapon in combating royal oppression. Unable to fight 
unpopular laws in Parliament, Americans used the jury to nullify legislation. 
‘Victimless’ crimes, like sedition and smuggling, were essentially unenforceable 
because they lacked public support.”). 
 254. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1763, at 540 (5th ed. 1891). 
 255. Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243 
(1897) (“One of the objections made to the acceptance of the constitution as it came 
from the hands of the convention of 1787 was that it did not, in express words, 
preserve the right of trial by jury, and that, under it, facts tried by a jury could be 
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Federalist, observing the only disagreement regarding the role of 
juries was that “the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; 
the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.”256 The 
Supreme Court has long touted the Seventh Amendment right to trial 
by jury as a “fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of the 
people.”257 The Court has cautioned that “any seeming curtailment of 
the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care”258 
and “every encroachment upon it has been watched with great 
jealousy.”259  
In deciding whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right 
to a jury, the Court adopts a two-step inquiry. The first question is 
whether the claim was “tried at law at the time of the founding or is at 
least analogous to one that was.”260 And if it was, the second question 
is “whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to 
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 
1791.”261 Stated plainly, if the case had been filed in 1792, would it 
have been filed in the common law courts or in the equity courts?262 
At the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, legal and equitable 
suits were adjudicated in separate forums. But in 1938, the systems 
were unified such that legal and equitable actions are now adjudicated 
in the same forum.263 Notwithstanding this merger, the Supreme Court 
 
reexamined by the courts of the United States otherwise than according to the rules of 
the common law. The seventh amendment was intended to meet these objections, and 
to deprive the courts of the United States of any such authority.”). Accord Wolfram, 
supra note 251, at 657. 
 256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Lodge ed., 
1888). 
 257. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830). 
 258. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
 259. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446 (quoted in Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 
364, 378 (1913)). 
 260. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 
708 (1999) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 
(1996)); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (“First, 
we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of 
England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the 
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”). 
 261. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 708. 
 262. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (“[W]e compare the 
statutory action to 18th century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the 
merger of the courts of law and equity.”); see also Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How 
to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 
1020–30 (1992). 
 263. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”); 
see also City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 708. 
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“has carefully preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are 
at stake.”264 Thus, if the nature and remedy would historically have 
required a jury trial, then the Seventh Amendment preserves a jury 
right.265 
By its terms, the Seventh Amendment not only preserves a right 
to a jury trial in “[s]uits at common law,” but it also limits the courts’ 
authority to re-examine facts tried by juries.266 Conceptually, the 
Seventh Amendment affords two dimensions on which it protects the 
right to a jury: horizontally and vertically. The label “horizontal” is 
used to reflect the choice between two factfinders in the same setting. 
In other words, on a horizontal plane, the allocation is between the 
trial judge and the jury. On the other hand, the label “vertical” is used 
to reflect the standard of review applied to the original factfinder—
either trial judge or jury. On a vertical plane, the standard of review 
(deference or de novo) allocates decision-making authority between 
the original factfinder and an appellate body.267 
Horizontally, the first clause of the Seventh Amendment 
provides that the “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved” in cases 
that traditionally arose at common law, as opposed to equity cases that 
were heard by the chancery court. This first clause allocates decision-
making authority between the trial judge and the jury. This horizontal 
allocation decides (1) which civil actions trigger the right to a jury and 
(2) which questions must be decided by the jury once the right is 
triggered.268  
Vertically, the second clause of the Seventh Amendment 
allocates decision-making authority between the appellate court and 
the jury.269 The second clause provides that “no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than 
 
 264. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990). 
 265. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 266. Id. 
 267. This Article adopts the fiction that appellate court deference is a binary 
question: either a determination is given deference or it is not. Gradations of appellate 
deference—while acknowledged—are ignored in the present analysis. 
 268. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 687, 708–09; see also Paul F. Kirgis, 
The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1126 (2003). 
 269. Cf. Higginbotham, supra note 236, at 50 (“The substance and fervor of 
the political debate [surrounding the enactment of the Seventh Amendment] suggest 
the concern that elimination of the jury would result in a shift of power, not to the trial 
judge, but to the appellate courts.”); id. at 58 (“[T]he risk of expanded appellate power 
increases with every encroachment on the jury; jury use and the scope of appellate 
power appear locked in a tandem relationship.”). 
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according to the rules of the common law.”270 This Reexamination 
Clause thus shields jury-found facts from reevaluation,271 and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extend a similar shield to trial-judge-
found facts.272 While there are technical distinctions between 
reviewing jury trial findings for substantial evidence and bench trial 
findings for clear error, both original factfinders are generally 
reviewed deferentially.273  
Appellate court deference to the original factfinder is, in the 
words of the Court, “the rule, not the exception.”274 The Court’s 
explanation for this deference includes both functional and prudential 
concerns: 
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the 
superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of 
credibility. The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with 
experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial 
judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only 
negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion 
of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already 
been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the 
trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them 
to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. 
As the Court has stated in a different context, the trial on the merits should 
be “the ‘main event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’”275 
In articulating appellate standards of review, the Court has often noted 
the “respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate 
courts.”276 And as a court of appeals once admonished, “we are not 
 
 270. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 271. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 
358–59 (1962) (“[N]either we nor the Court of Appeals can redetermine facts found 
by the jury any more than the District Court can predetermine them.”). 
 272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court 
must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ 
credibility.”). 
 273. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(acknowledging different labels of appellate review but suggesting “heretically” there 
are “operationally only two degrees of review, plenary (that is, no deference given to 
the tribunal being reviewed) and deferential”); see also supra note 267. 
 274. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
 275. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)). 
 276. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991). Accord Miller 
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (focusing on when “one judicial actor is better 
positioned than another to decide the issue in question”). 
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some kind of superjury, from whom losing parties can get a second 
bite at the apple.”277  
As noted above, the fact/law classification is important because 
the label affects who can decide an issue.278 The fact/law distinction 
drives both the horizontal and vertical allocation of decision-making 
authority. Horizontally, the Supreme Court has long recognized the 
“good old rule” that generally questions of fact are entrusted to the 
jury and questions of law are the province of the courts to decide.279 
On appeal, findings of fact—from a bench trial or a jury trial—are 
given deference, whereas conclusions of law are given non-
deferential, plenary review.280 When an appellate court reviews a 
matter deferentially, the center of gravity of that decision rests with 
the lower court.281 Deference to the original fact finder is appropriate 
because, as the Court explained, the trial should be the “main event” 
rather than a “tryout on the road.”282 On the other hand, if an appellate 
court can decide the matter anew, finality of that question does not rest 
 
 277. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1336 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoted in Sheehan 
v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 278. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial 
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1170 (2001) (“[A]rguing that 
the law-fact divide is a shibboleth, something that the Court invokes to justify a 
conclusion about whether it or Congress should settle an issue, not something with 
independent analytical force.”); see also J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the 
Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1985) (“The question of citizen 
control versus judicial control embodies the significance of the law/fact distinction.”). 
 279. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794). 
 280. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“The controlling 
distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the 
power to determine the law and the latter to determine the facts.”). But see U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CW Capital Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 960, 967 n.4 (2018) (“Usually but not always: In the constitutional realm, for 
example, the calculus changes. There, we have often held that the role of appellate 
courts ‘in marking out the limits of [a] standard through the process of case-by-case 
adjudication’ favors de novo review even when answering a mixed question primarily 
involves plunging into a factual record.”) (citations omitted). 
 281. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (“Rule 
52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous    
. . . . The Rule does not apply to conclusions of law.”); see also Bryan Adamson, 
Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race Discrimination 
Findings as Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2009) (“As a 
general proposition, standards of review confine appellate inquiry and judgments 
within a discrete decisional framework. For example, by directing that facts found by 
a trial court be reviewed only for clear error, Rule 52(a) binds the appellate judge to 
respond to the facts in a particular way and not to engage in a more active inquiry.”). 
 282. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
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with the lower court.283 Vertically, standards of appellate review 
channel decision-making authority between trial and appellate court 
levels.284 Thus the fact/law shibboleth dictates (1) who will be the 
decisionmaker at the trial court level and (2) the scope of appellate 
review of that decision.285 
But questions of fact and questions of law are not hermetically 
distinct.286 Mixed questions of law and fact—such as fair use—are 
those that fall “somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a 
simple historical fact.”287 The chimerical category of “mixed questions 
of law and fact” has long bedeviled courts and commentators.288 Part 
of the difficulty is that denominating a question “mixed” is descriptive 
but not predictive. There is no analytical way to predict the standard 
of review for law-application-mixed-questions.289 As Professor 
Stephen Weiner remarked, “[s]ince law application cannot be 
meaningfully described as either lawmaking or factfinding, such 
terminology is not a useful analytical tool in answering the question 
 
 283. See Louis, supra note 196, at 997. 
 284. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 
74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 232 (1991) (“[S]tandards [of appellate review] define the 
allocation of power between the trial and appellate courts.”); Louis, supra note 196, 
at 997 (“Scope of review, therefore, is the principal means by which adjudicative 
decisional power and responsibility are divided between the trial and appellate 
levels.”). 
 285. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2003) (arguing the “decision to label an 
issue ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is a functional one based on who should decide it under what 
standard, and is not based on the nature of the issue”); Parker, supra note 278, at 485 
(“[T]he labeling of a ‘mixed question’ as either ‘law’ or ‘fact’ traditionally has been 
important because that labeling dictates (1) the allocation of the fact application task 
to judge or jury at trial, and (2) the scope of the subsequent appellate review.”). 
 286. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1995) (“[T]he proper 
characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery.”); see also 
Allen & Pardo, supra note 285, at 1790 (rejecting the notion “that legal and factual 
issues constitute discrete ontological categories”). 
 287. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). 
 288. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 n.19 (1982); 
Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate 
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236 (1991) (noting the 
blended nature of mixed questions seems “to sit precisely at the midpoint between the 
Scylla of allowing errors to go uncorrected and the Charybdis of judicial 
inefficiency”). 
 289. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 129 (2005) (“What is confusing about evaluative 
determinations, however, is that they are sometimes reviewed deferentially, as in the 
case of negligence, and sometimes de novo, as in the case of probable cause. Yet there 
is no analytical way to distinguish between these categories.”). 
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confronting the court.”290 Thus, the fact/law distinction is a conclusion; 
it is not a guide for coming to a conclusion.291  
In categorizing a mixed question as either law-like or fact-like, 
the Supreme Court has noted that “the fact/law distinction at times has 
turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration 
of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide 
the issue in question.”292 But law-application can be done either by the 
judge or jury; it is not necessarily clear which original factfinder is 
“better positioned” to do it.293 Abstract concepts, like negligence or 
community standards, are often decided by juries.294 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has reiterated that “the application-of-legal-standard-
to-fact sort of question . . . commonly called a ‘mixed question of law 
and fact,’ has typically been resolved by juries.”295 Thus, whether the 
judge or the jury is entrusted with deciding a particular question is, at 
base, a policy question.296 But this policy question of “better position” 
should not ignore the Seventh Amendment. 
Scholars warn that subjecting jury verdicts to de novo review 
risks undermining the Seventh Amendment.297 There are some who 
worry that denominating an issue a “mixed question” is simply a 
 
 290. Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1022 (1967). 
 291. See EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 193, at 8–9 (“[T]he fact/law 
paradigm falters as a method for determining whether appellate review should be de 
novo or deferential.”). 
 292. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114. 
 293. See Parker, supra note 278, at 486 (“A ‘mixed question of law and fact’ 
is not, as the phrase might suggest, an issue which is simply part law and part fact to 
which Coke’s axiom can be mechanically applied. Rather, it is a term that describes 
the situation in which facts must be applied to legal principles, a task that can be done 
by either judge or jury.”). 
 294. See id. (“It is wrong to conclude that all ideas or abstract concepts are 
automatically questions of law and thus solely for the judge to decide. Courts have 
traditionally recognized that some issues of this nature, especially those concerning 
community standards, ought to be decided by a jury.”). 
 295. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (quoting United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995)). 
 296. See Gergen, supra note 240, at 423 (“Ultimately, the balance one strikes 
between judge and jury may depend upon whether one thinks of law as social 
engineering or as a civil religion. The social engineer wants to limit the jury’s role 
because of its unpredictability (it is no surprise that Holmes wanted to reduce the role 
of the jury); the civil priest celebrates the jury’s role if he is of truly Protestant 
disposition.”) (citation omitted). 
 297. See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
767, 804–05 (2005) (noting that the Seventh Amendment “right to a jury trial can 
become illusory if the judiciary is free to prevent the jury from hearing cases or is free 
to eliminate jury verdicts”). 
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backdoor method to reassess the outcome.298 The worry is that 
appellate courts may recast questions of fact into questions of law in 
order to impose the court’s policy viewpoint on the decision. Scholars 
criticize the fact/law distinction as merely a “camouflage for the 
normative conclusion that a question should go to the judge or to the 
jury.”299 Pressing beyond the fact/law distinction reveals that the 
allocation may reflect little more than appellate preference. The 
fact/law distinction is too malleable to be a reliable predictor for 
allocating decision-making authority for jury findings.300 When a jury 
verdict can simply be reclassified as a question of law, the 
classification is little more than a policy question—which appellate 
courts get to decide.301  
Whether the focus is on the fact/law distinction, the superiority 
of institutional actors, or the nature of the right at stake,302 horizontal 
and vertical allocation of decision-making authority risks being 
unhinged and independent of the Seventh Amendment. Scholars have 
 
 298. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 268, at 1180 (noting “the ease with which 
courts can manipulate the jury right by adopting rules of law that call for ‘legal’ rather 
than ‘factual’ questions”); Louis, supra note 196, at 1018, 1028 (warning of “a direct 
judicial assault on the prerogatives of fact finders[]” by classifying “ultimate facts as 
questions of law amounts to a manipulation of the law-fact doctrine to take questions 
from the jury or to subject the trial level’s resolution of questions to free appellate 
review”). 
 299. Kirgis, supra note 268, at 1128; see also Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh 
Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 574 
(2003) (“It has been suggested that the law/fact distinction is nothing but a mask for 
a policy decision about which questions should be given to the judge and which to the 
jury.”). 
 300. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 
SMU L. REV. 1695, 1734 (2001) (“This ‘question of law’ approach to reconciliation 
of weight of the evidence review with the reexamination clause is an unsatisfactory 
one because it provides no principled restraints on the judicial review of jury findings 
and gives the wrong guidance to the courts of appeals.”); Margaret L. Moses, What 
the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 256 (2000) (“If the Seventh Amendment 
guarantee is so malleable that any desired result can be obtained by changing 
methodology, then the Amendment’s usefulness is diminished.”). 
 301. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the 
Standard of Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339, 357 (2009) (“[B]ased on the less than 
clearly defined line between law and fact, an appellate court can easily review and 
decide a factual issue by simply recasting it as a question of law and applying a de 
novo standard of review instead of the more stringent clearly erroneous standard.”). 
 302. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984) 
(drawing the line between fact and law “varies according to the nature of the 
substantive law at issue”). 
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observed a steady erosion of the jury right.303 One source of erosion is 
the removal of questions from juries by converting factual questions 
into legal questions.304 
No coordinate branch of government has the power to protect 
the right to a jury. While the separation of powers influences the 
allocation of authority among the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches, no analogous body polices the division of power between 
the judiciary and the jury.305 The judiciary is relied upon to police 
itself. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once counseled, “[t]he attitude of 
judicial humility . . . is not an abdication of the judicial function. It is 
a due observance of its limits.”306 Only judicial self-restraint governs 
the preservation of a right to a jury.307 
As discussed above, fair use is a mixed question of law and 
fact.308 The fact/law distinction thus begs the question whether fair use 
is more like a question of fact, for which an appellate court should 
apply deferential review, or whether fair use is more like a question of 
 
 303. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving 
Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 816 
(2014) (tracing “a steady decline in the importance of civil juries”); Moses, supra note 
300, at 183 (“[T]he parameters of the jury trial right have changed over time, 
generally, although not exclusively, in the direction of restricting the jury’s role.”); 
Robert A. Patterson, Comment, Reviving the Civil Jury Trial: Implementing Short, 
Summary, and Expedited Trial Programs, 2014 BYU L. REV. 951, 951 (2014) (“The 
civil jury trial is losing its place in America’s justice system.”); see also Galloway v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting “the gradual 
process of judicial erosion which in one hundred fifty years has slowly worn away a 
major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment”). 
 304. See Sward, supra note 299, at 638 (“For well over one hundred years, 
courts have found procedural excuses for taking questions of fact away from juries.”); 
id. at 639 (“Fact has become law, and as it becomes law, it is withdrawn from the 
jury.”). 
 305. See Thomas, supra note 297, at 771–72. 
 306. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 307. See Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEX. L. REV. 357, 
358 (1957) (“There is nothing to prevent [an] invasion of the jury’s province except 
the self-restraint of the judges themselves. It is simply an institutional risk. Where 
impulses are so strong to do ultimate justice, and where the jury and what its members 
heard, observed and considered are so far removed from the chambers of the court, 
the brakes of self-restraint are severely taxed. The supreme power in a court system 
as in any other hierarchy inevitably increases with its exercise.”). 
 308. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 13.05 (“Fair use is said 
to constitute a mixed issue of law and fact, but what facts will be sufficient to raise 
this defense in any given case is not easily answered.”). 
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law, for which an appellate court can decide anew.309 If an appellate 
court concludes fair use is more law-like than fact-like, the court can 
decide fair use de novo, without deference to the original factfinder.310 
This would undermine the well-established roles of trial and appellate 
courts and would reallocate adjudicative authority to a federal 
appellate court. If, like in Oracle v. Google,311 an appellate court can 
simply reexamine the question and redraw its own inference on the 
question of fair use, the jury right is a hollow shell.312 
The real question is whether we take seriously the notion that the 
jury has a constitutional role in deciding important matters.313 Some 
scholars argue that the jury should be able to decide constitutional 
issues,314 whereas others are more circumspect.315 Some argue juries 
serve as populist protectors that possess a better sense of community 
values and norms,316 whereas others worry the jury reflects the 
 
 309. Cf. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 913 (2015) (holding 
that trademark tacking is a question for the jury); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996) (holding that patent construction is a question for 
a judge); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) 
(holding a right to a jury trial to determine the amount of statutory damages). 
 310. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. 
at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 968 (2018). 
 311. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956). 
 312. See Dorsaneo, supra note 300, at 1699 (“If the inferences drawn by the 
jury could be cast aside by trial judges or appellate courts merely because the judges 
regard the jury’s inferences, as reflected in the verdict form, as less convincing or 
reasonable than competing inferences, the right to trial by jury would be rendered 
considerably less meaningful.”). 
 313. Cf. Hana Fin., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 911 (“[W]e have long recognized across 
a variety of doctrinal contexts that, when the relevant question is how an ordinary 
person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the 
decisionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer.”); see also Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1199 n.99 (2013) (“Whether appellate courts should defer to jury 
factfinding in constitutional rights cases is a complicated question. Scholars have 
made compelling arguments both for and against appellate deference in such cases.”). 
 314. See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s Constitutional Judgment, 67 
ALA. L. REV. 189, 193–94 (2015) (“[T]rial judges should ordinarily allow the jury to 
apply constitutional doctrine to the facts of a case; and . . . courts of appeals should 
review the jury’s application of constitutional law for reasonableness.”). 
 315. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 123 (2008) (“Because the jury represents values 
associated with the political majority, it cannot fully be entrusted with protection of 
the values inherent in the Bill of Rights.”). 
 316. See Amar, supra note 237, at 1183 (“Guaranteed in no less than three 
amendments, juries were at the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth safeguarded the 
role of the grand jury; the Sixth, the criminal petit jury; and the Seventh, the civil 
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political majority that cannot be trusted to protect unpopular 
minorities.317 While not directly addressing this question, the Court has 
at times recognized the jury’s role in drawing “legitimate inferences 
from the facts,”318 rather than simply finding the who-what-when 
historical facts. Relegating juries to finding only historical facts denies 
the long-standing tradition of having citizen jurors decide important 
speech questions like obscenity319 and libel.320 As noted above, fair use 
raises similarly delicate speech questions. The Supreme Court long 
ago remarked, “It is assumed that twelve men know more of the 
common affairs of life than does one man, [and] that they can draw 
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than 
can a single judge.”321 Citizen jurors have long been relied upon to 
decide questions like defamation and obscenity. Similarly, citizen 
jurors are competent and capable of deciding fair use.322 
 
jury.”); Chapman, supra note 314, at 195 (arguing the jury has a “uniquely popular 
voice,” and “[w]hen the jury brings that voice to bear on constitutional questions, it 
serves as a popular structural check on government officers”); Louis, supra note 196, 
at 1010 (suggesting juries have a “greater sense of community values, customs, 
practices, and standards”). 
 317. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes 
Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888 (2009) (“One reason for independent factfinding is to 
assure adequate enforcement of constitutional guarantees toward which there is 
majority antagonism that could seep into jury factfinding.”); see also Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971) (applying heightened standards in cases 
involving the First Amendment because there may be times when the jury is “unlikely 
to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming 
an instrument for the suppression of those ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks’ which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail” (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY 
OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969). 
 318. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of 
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986))); see also United States 
v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 506 (1995) (“[T]he jury’s constitutional responsibility is not 
merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate 
conclusion . . . .”). 
 319. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 320. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262. 
 321. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 664 (1874) (quoted in Hana Fin., Inc. v. 
Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015)). 
 322. See generally Amanda Reid, Safeguarding Fair Use Through First 
Amendment’s Asymmetric Constitutional Fact Review, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
23 (2019) (arguing that fair use is a constitutional fact for which appellate courts 
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The fact/law methodology for allocating decision-making 
responsibility occludes the plainly political question: who do we want 
to make this particular decision? Resolving the allocative question on 
who should be the decisionmaker turns on who, as a matter of policy, 
should decide the question.323 Such allocation is a normative decision, 
not a purely analytic one.324 Without a reliable guide to allocating 
decision-making authority, the question becomes one of expedience 
and preference. Prudential concerns prevail over constitutional 
concerns. Laying bear this pure policy question reveals a weakness of 
the Seventh Amendment: courts are able to (unaccountably) elide the 
Seventh Amendment at will.325 
CONCLUSION 
An often-overlooked question is who should decide the 
important questions of the day. This Article has taken up the inquiry 
as it relates to copyright fair use. Conceptually, fair use is a public 
policy question. The better policy view is that fair use is a statutory 
right, a speech-protective safeguard, and a defense—but not an 
affirmative defense. Operationally, who decides fair use is a judicial 
policy question. Who decides a particular question is informed by the 
nature of the question.  
Courts are arbiters of law, and juries are arbiters of facts. For a 
mixed question of law and fact, who decides is driven by whether the 
question is more fact-like or more law-like. Categorizing such 
questions is, at its core, an allocative policy question. The policy 
answer is driven by the nature of the question, relative institutional 
skills, and the importance of the interest at stake. Properly seen as an 
affirmative right, and not an affirmative defense, the interests at stake 
 
should engage in a one-way, asymmetric review of jury determinations adverse to the 
fair-use-claimant in order to guard against Type 1 errors). 
 323. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 192, at 237 (“The real issue is not analytic, but 
allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issue?”) (citations omitted). 
 324. Cf. EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 193, at 8–9 (“The fact/law paradigm 
thus functions as an accurate proxy for ascertaining whether the trial or appellate court 
would better perform the decisionmaking task implicated on appeal.”).  
 325. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing the 
judiciary would be the “least dangerous branch” because it lacks the power of either 
the purse or the sword) with ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (disputing the “least 
dangerous branch” and arguing the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” of judicial 
review). 
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in fair use cases are a user’s right to free expression balanced against 
a copyright holder’s statutory privilege.  
This Article contributes to the scholarly conversations by laying 
bare the reality that who decides the question of copyright fair use is 
nakedly political.326 Courts are actively wrestling with this unresolved 
policy question.327 The Seventh Amendment fashions a policy 
preference for juries to decide questions of fact. Moreover, history 
confirms a long tradition of relying on juries to make fair use 
determinations. But it is unclear if this tradition will continue. Without 
Supreme Court guidance, categorizing fair use as more law-like or 
more fact-like is so slippery and malleable that the Seventh 
Amendment ceases to be an influence—much less a command.  
  
 
 326. Cf. Carys J. Craig, Globalizing User Rights-Talk: On Copyright Limits 
and Rhetorical Risks, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 54 (2017) (observing that in the 
American Legal Realist movement. “[s]imply put, all law is policy”); Marouf Hasian, 
Jr., Myth and Ideology in Legal Discourse: Moving from Critical Legal Studies 
Toward Rhetorical Consciousness, 17 LEGAL STUD. F. 347, 348 (1994) (noting the 
“elusive quest for a middle ground between self-evident or discovered constitutional 
truths and nihilistic relativism”). 
 327. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted, 2019 WL 6042317 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2019) (No. 18-956); Corbello v. 
DeVito, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Nev. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-16337 (9th 
Cir. Jun. 29, 2017). 
